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Evidence from Professional Basketball 
Introduction 
Fixed term contracts are becoming more prevalent in many occupations. They allow the 
employer to secure the services of a given employee for a fixed period of time and provide job 
security for the employee. However, given the recent examples of companies w h o have signed 
lucrative contracts with executives, only to pay large sums to terminate those contracts (Burns, 
2007), the effects on performance of such job security warrant further attention. Namely, it is 
important to understand h o w the signing of a fixed term contract affects the performance of an 
employee, especially in the case of asymmetrical information. Arguably, such a condition 
characterizes the majority of employment relationships, thereby highlighting the importance of 
this issue. 
As Cantor (1988) states, "a common feature of contracts is that they state explicit, 
deterministic termination dates at which contractual obligations and rights cease" (p. 343). Such 
a contract provides an employee with a guaranteed payout for a minimum level of performance, 
thereby offering little or no immediate incentive to perform above such a minimum . O n the 
other hand, the employee is well aware of when the contract term ends and, therefore, when he 
will be forced to renegotiate, either with the current employer or a new one. The important 
question is whether the incentive to shirk his/her responsibilities will outweigh the control 
offered by the known contract end date (Cantor 1988). Specifically, will this renegotiation, 
which would presumably be based on past performance, encourage above-minimum 
performance, or will the employee simply adjust his/her performance over the life of the contract 
in order to maximize the net benefit in both the present and future? The answer to this question 
will have a bearing on how fixed term contracts should be designed and implemented. 
The next section will discuss some of the theoretical conceptions of fixed term contracts, 
followed by a detailed discussion of the motivational theories leading to the proposed hypothesis. 
Finally, an empirical study of professional basketball players will be outlined, and results 
discussed. Professional basketball players in the National Basketball Association ( N B A ) were 
chosen for a variety of reasons. First, the public availability of various statistics for professional 
sports in general makes it uniquely suited to empirical research. Second, professional sports 
extensively utilize fixed term contracts, where players are tied to one team for a given period of 
time and where both parties are well aware of the contract end date. Furthermore because so 
much of an athlete's performance depends on his off-field behaviours (i.e diet training, 
avoidance of unhealthy substances) but the employer (coach, manager) can only observe the on-
above7ZSZ,0n? "^ IT mCentlve Clauses built in which w o u ld offer additional rewards for performance 
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1 
field performance, there is a clear asymmetry of information. Lastly, the N B A was specifically 
chosen because it reports both offensive and defensive performance statistics for all players 
therefore minimizing the effect that a given players position would have on the performance 
statistics. 
Contracts 
This paper is mainly concerned with fixed term contracts as defined by Cantor (1988). 
Such agreements allow the contracting organization to be able to plan and budget labour costs, as 
well as future projects. Since the organization knows exactly how much it will be paying a given 
employee for how long, the labour costs are known barring any incentive clauses. At the same 
time, because the employee has agreed to the contract, the organization does not have to face the 
problems of an employee being recruited away at a crucial point. Finally, the organization can 
plan any projects involving the employee around his contract to ensure projects are completed 
with the necessary staff. 
However, contracts also have certain advantages for the employee. The employee enjoys 
job security, as he knows exactly h o w long he will be employed and how much he will earn. 
This enables the employee to plan his finances and time around his contractual obligations and, 
by knowing exactly when his contract ends, the employee can take pre-emptive steps to ensure 
ongoing employment. At the same time, the job security created by the contract may create an 
opportunity for shirking, as the employee has no incentive to increase his effort level although the 
knowledge of a specific end date may serve to partially control the employee since he knows 
exactly when he will be forced to re-negotiate his employment (Cantor 1988). 
One important aspect of all employment relationships, and especially contracts, is the 
asymmetry of information. The employee will always have better information regarding his 
ability and effort levels than the employer (Baker, 1992). Therefore, although the employer can 
observe the employee's performance, he cannot determine whether the employee is performing at 
his maximum capacity or shirking. The employer is forced to use incentives in an attempt to 
align the interests of the employee with those of the organization, thereby hoping to benefit from 
the employee's m a x i m u m effort (Baker, 1992). The employee, however, experiences a cost 
associated with his effort level (Sherstyuk, 2000). W e must assume that there is some cost 
associated with any given level of employee effort, possibly in the form of foregone leisure time, 
money, stress or other factors, which discourage the employee from putting forth effort that costs 
more than the benefits he receives. Alternatively, an employee experiences some disutility from 
performing the action (Sherstyuk, 2000), which offsets the increase in utility received from the 
benefit or reward. Furthermore, because the employee has better information, he can better 
evaluate the net utility he receives from a contract and, therefore, has an incentive to maximize 
his utility by decreasing his effort. This pattern will continue as long as his effort does not fall 
below the minimum expected level or result in a corresponding decrease in the expected rewards. 
Another important feature is the length of the contract. As contract length increases, the 
negotiating costs for both parties decrease since these costs are spread out over a longer time 
period (Cantor, 1988). However, since the terms of a contract are based on the information 
possessed by both parties at the negotiation date, the contract must be periodically adjusted to 
incorporate any new information, which may appear during the performance of the contract 
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(Cantor 1988). Due to the asymmetrical nature of the information, either party may realize that 
their original assumptions were wrong and therefore want to change some of the contract terms. 
If the contract is too long, the parties may not want to take this risk as they could be locked into 
an unfavorable contract for a long period of time. If the contract is too short, however, the often-
recurring negotiation costs may make the contract less appealing (Cantor 1988). Therefore, some 
optimal contract level must be chosen which will offset these factors. Cantor (1988) argues that 
if an agent will only exert effort during the last k periods of a contract, in order to maximize his 
chances of re-negotiating a favorable contract, the optimal contract length is k. Since the 
employee is assumed to discount his future wages, a contract that is too long will cause the 
employee to perceive his future, re-negotiated wages as too low to warrant any effort in the 
present. However, as these future wages get closer, the employee values them more and is 
willing to work harder for them (Cantor 1998). Therefore, it is the employer's responsibility to 
ensure an ideal contract length so that the employee is willing to work throughout the entire 
contract (i.e. the employee assigns a positive value to his future earnings throughout the 
contracting period). 
Motivation 
One important factor to consider is the employee's motivation to perform at a given level 
Expectancy theory posits that an employee evaluates two issues: the expected outcome given a 
evel of effort or performance, and the expected value of the award resulting from that outcome 
(Behling and Starke, 1973; Reinharth and Wahba, 1975; Steel and Konig, 2006)) Therefore we 
can write the employee's problem as 
max u=E(V| E(0| e)), where: 
u=utility 
V=valence of reward 
0=outcome 
e=effort 
E(.)=expected value 
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valuable reward (i.e. a lucrative contract). If w e assume that there is no cost until the reward is 
received, everyone would have an incentive to exert effort as long as the difference between the 
value of the reward and the cost in the future was positive. However, if the cost and valence are 
calculated at the same point in time, expectancy theory does not discount for the time lag. 
As an example let's consider a player, P who exerts a given level of effort, E, at 
point to because he expects to earn a contract for amount V, at time ti. W e must 
treat the cost of the effort, C, as being incurred at the same time as the E, so that 
when the player receives his contract, he will subtract the current value, that is the 
value at ti, of C. In this case, as the difference between to and ti increases, C will 
increase thereby reducing the overall value of the future contract. Alternatively, as 
the time lag increases the present value of V decreases and will at some point 
become negligible. W h e n this happens, the player no longer has an incentive to 
work to become a professional basketball player and abandons the effort. 
However, if w e only take C into account at ti, then V-C would be much higher, 
prompting more players to exert maximum E. Since the time lag is not playing a 
role, the player would not be forced to evaluate if it is feasible to become a 
professional basketball player (i.e. possibly due to talent, physical attributes, etc.) 
and would be missing the signal telling him to move on to a new career choice. 
Although w e surely see individuals w h o have a hard time abandoning dreams of 
playing professional sports, most do realize quite early on that the effort that would 
be required n o w to reach the level of professional sports is too high and the payoff 
will be too low to justify that effort. 
In a recent article, Steel and Konig (2006) attempted to integrate four theories of 
motivation, including expectancy and equity theory, into what they refer to as "temporal 
motivation theory" (Steel and Konig, 2006). This theory emphasizes time as a prime factor in 
motivation and recognizes that positive and negative outcomes must be treated differently. Their 
final model is (Steel and Konig 2006, pg. 897): 
* E£PTxV£PT " ECPT x VCPT 
Utility - 2,
 z + r+(r _ t)
 +
 2,
 z + TzlT - t) 
i=i f=*+i 
(5) 
ECpT=events capacity to contribute to overall outcome value (p. 895) 
VcpT=incremental increase in valence of each outcome 
Z=constant which represents value at time lag=0 
T-t=difference between time decision made and time reward expected 
r=temporal discount rate 
+ or - represents positive or negative outcomes 
This theory assumes that individuals categorize all outcomes into k positive and n-k 
negative outcomes and sum up their contributions to utility. Another important feature of this 
model is that the discount rate for gains and losses is different. This captures the fact that 
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although people generally prefer to get rewards in the present, they prefer to defer punishments or 
losses into the future (Steel and Konig, 2006). 
This theory is uniquely suited to our discussion of NBA players' motivation^ Positive 
outcomes are the dollar value of the contract, both current and future possible ones. The negative 
outcomes are the cost of effort. Using the framework outlined above, w e can make several 
observations. ._ . . ., , . 
i) The longer a player has to renegotiate his contract, or as (T-t) increases, the less the 
future contract amount will contribute to the player's current utility. 
ii) Any other potential sources of income, such as endorsement contracts, would be 
treated in the same manner as future contracts with their o w n specific time lags. 
iii) The effort must be exerted now, thereby incurring the effort cost n o w and decreasing 
the player's overall utility. As the amount of effort needed to secure a future contract 
or endorsement increases, current utility will decrease. 
iv) If the player has some contract already in place, the earnings from that contract should 
not affect his utility, or if they do they would be represented by a "constant" term so 
that they would not be a factor in the consideration of effort. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the further off the potential future earnings are, the lower 
the effort that will be put forth since the cost of that effort will decrease utility more than the 
present value of the future contract will increase it. 
Another way to treat losses in future income is as a negative outcome. In this case, the 
decrease in future earnings will be subtracted from utility, but since it will be calculated as a 
present value (discounted because of the time lag), the magnitude of their effect will depend on 
how far in the future these earnings are. W h e n a player first signs a contract, the losses in future 
income are far away but the benefits of shirking, in the form of lower effort and therefore higher 
current utility, are immediate. This brings us to our first hypothesis: 
HI: When a new contract is signed, performance will decrease. 
However, as the end of the contract draws nearer, the expected decrease in future income 
will become larger as its present value increases, therefore having a larger effect on utility. At the 
point where the loss of income decreases utility more than the effort required to secure that 
income, the player will put forth more effort. This brings us to our second hypothesis: 
H2: As the time of contract completion nears, performance will increase. 
Finally, the point where the loss from future earnings equals benefits form shirking, the 
player is indifferent. However, as the losses overtake the benefits, the player will put forth more 
effort. Therefore, contracts should be designed so that the equality point of losses and benefits 
comes as early as possible in the contract so that the majority of the contract time the player is 
llatn ™ I t ? "!? °Ur P r i 0 U S d i S C U S S i ° n in regards t0 where costs should be calculated * expectancy theory. 
Again, we see that costs must be recognized at the same time as the effort. 
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exerting effort. Ideally, w e would want this period of losses=benefits to occur when the contract 
is signed. This brings us to our final hypothesis: 
H3: As contract length increases, performance will decrease. 
Data 
The data used in this study span three seasons of the NBA: 2003-2004, 2004-2005, 2005-
2006. The N B A season normally runs from October until April, with teams playing 82 games per 
season. There are currently 30 teams in 6 divisions, 29 of them in the United States with one 
team located in Toronto, Canada. The players used in this study where the five starters for each 
of the thirty teams during the 2005-2006 season. Although I originally intended to collect data 
on all 15 players on all 30 teams, there were several problems encountered. Namely, players who 
where not starters tended to be either rookies with no previous performance data, more 
experienced players with more complicated contracts, or players w h o were traded more often. 
Players with complicated contracts involving incentive clauses were removed to simplify the 
analysis. In collecting the data, players w h o had been traded during their contract were removed. 
This was done for several reasons. First, it is quite difficult to determine if the acquiring team 
will be keeping the original contract exactly as it is. Therefore, any changes made could reflect 
the player's poor performance, thereby risking inaccurate observations. Also, there may be 
specific team characteristics, such as geographic location, fans, or stadium, which may affect a 
player's performance separately from the stage of the players contract. In fact, Nicholson, 
McTeer and White (1998) did find some evidence that changing teams can affect the 
performance of major league baseball players. Finally, since part of the analysis involved 
comparing the players salary to that of his teammates, it was necessary to have players w h o had 
been with a team throughout the season, therefore any players traded mid-season were not used. 
Furthermore, any players who had options on their contracts (i.e. some later part of their 
contract, such as the last year, is optional based on their performance) were considered to have 
two contracts: the multiple year contract of the first part, and the one-year extension was treated 
separately. This was done because the optional year is not guaranteed to the player upon signing 
and the player should not treat it as a given. Also, the team's choice to exercise an option 
represents a new, one-year contract being formed. Another issue was the free-agency problem. 
Free agents are allowed to choose the teams they negotiate with, whereas non-free agency players 
are "owned" by the teams that drafted them (Kahn, 1993). Henry (1994) shows that participants 
are more likely to overestimate their performance if they believe have a choice in some detail of 
the task to be performed. This may imply that players w h o are free agents (i.e. have choice in 
where they play and under what conditions) may have a tendency to overestimate their 
performance. W h e n they do not perform to the levels promised, they may be more likely to be 
traded. Also, Kahn, (1993) shows that contract length may be affected by a player's free-agency 
status. Although this was not accounted for in our sample, I believe that this omission should 
not significantly affect our results, as w e are interested in the effect of contract length, regardless 
of how that length is determined. 
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The total sample consisted of 202 observations4. All player statistics were collected from 
w w w N B A com, while contract information was found on wwwTealgm.com. Finally all team 
salary information was found in the www.usatoday.com salary database. M u c h of the player 
performance data was collected on a per game basis (assists points, rebounds, blocks, steals and 
turnovers) This was done to minimize the effect of the differences in games played. Other 
performance outcomes, such as the percentage of field goals and free throws successfully made 
are calculated over the entire season. However, since they are calculated as percentage of 
attempts, not a raw number, they should be unaffected by the number of games played. 
The year of contract variable represents the year that the current season represents of the 
players overall contract. For example, a player w h o signed a contract at the beginning of the 
2002-2003 season would be coded as Y R O F K = 2 in the 2003-2004 season, Y R O F K - 3 in the 
2004-2005 season, and so on. The percentage of contract completed, K C O M P (contract 
completion) variable was computed by dividing the Y R O F K (year of contract) variable by the 
K L E N G T H (contract length) variable. This was deemed useful since the Y R O F K variable was a 
raw number, but K C O M P provides a completion rate relative to total contract length. If a player 
was in the first year of a new contract, D V F Y R = 1 , and 0 otherwise. Similarly, if a player was in 
the last year of his contract, D V L Y R = 1 , and 0 otherwise. The D V T N T variable was a 
multiplication of these two du m m y variables to account for players w h o had only one-year 
contracts or had contract options exercised. 
The last two groups of variables are age and team related. The AGE variable represents a 
player's age at season's end. The N B A E X P ( N B A experience) variable is the player's age 
divided by his Y R S N B A (years in the N B A ) . This was necessary because age and experience 
can have different and sometimes opposing effects. W e would expect that as a player ages, his 
performance would drop off due to natural causes. However, increased experience may help his 
performance, as he is more comfortable in the professional sports atmosphere. Furthermore, the 
raw number of years spent in the N B A would be expected to have different effects relative to the 
player's age. Therefore, the N B A experience variable is a measure of the percentage of a 
player's life spent in the N B A . The team variables looked at the percentage of team salary 
(PCTTEAMP) that a player's individual salary represents and the difference from the median 
salary (MEDIFF). These were used to capture a player's "star" quality, which may account for a 
part of performance. Lastly, the player;s annual salary ( A N N U A L S A ) was also included to 
measure whether a large annual salary was in fact related to performance. 
One problem was finding a measure of "health". Unfortunately, there doesn't appear to be 
a disabled or injured list for players in the N B A . To complicate matters further, teams are often 
reluctant to report specific injuries in case other teams attempt to exploit such injuries in 
subsequent games. Berri and Krautmann (2006) get around this problem by using games played 
as a proxy for injury. However, there may be a few problems with this measure. First, players 
can miss games for multiple reasons, including injury, suspensions, or on the coach's discretion. 
4
 The original sample was 203 observations, however it was found that one player, Shaquille O'Neal acted as an 
outlier since there was only one observation (out of a possible 3) available for him. Given that Mr' O'Neal has 
played a long Ume m the N B A and earns quite a large salary, this observation was found to lead to inaccurate results 
and was subsequently removed. 
M*Z i 1™" *' f un-conteste^ anemPl at a basket resulting from a fowl committed against the shooting player. A 
field goal is any attempt to get the basketball in the basket during regular or overtime game play. 
7 
The concern here is that if a player is not performing well, he may be "benched" by the coach, 
but that lack of playing time may lead to lower performance and even less playing time, creating 
a cyclical effect. Also, in the past teams have been limited in the amount of players that were 
allowed on their roster. Players on a reserved or disabled list did not count towards this total, so 
teams could place players on the list, even if they were not injured, in order to have more players 
available. Both of these issues call into question the validity of using games missed as a measure 
of health. Finally, because our sample consists of starting players, the variance in games played 
would be expected to be so low as to be meaningless. 
Ordinary least squares regressions were run using two primary performance measures as 
the dependant variables: S U M and A C C . The first measure is a summation of all the per game 
variables (points+ assists+ rebounds+ blocks+steals-turnovers). Since these are the most reported 
player statistics and should be directly related to a team's wins, they are important in analyzing a 
player's performance. The second variable, A C C , is a summation of the player's free throw and 
field goal percentages This gives us a number out of 200, which was converted to a number out 
of 100 for simplicity. The measure of accuracy does not include three-pointer percentages6 
because this variable was found to not be relevant to all players. Given that some players may 
only make a few attempts at three-point shots in a season, their statistics were unusually high. As 
a result, the accuracy measure is restrained to the two percentages, which apply to all players. 
This total percentage provides a good representation of a player's accuracy and scoring potential 
since these it represent actual points earned, irrespective of the opponents' performance. 
Results 
We are expecting to see the following relationships: 
i) A positive relationship between performance and Y R O F K (H2), 
ii) A negative relationship between performance and K L E N G T H (H3), 
iii) A negative relationship between performance and D V F Y R (HI) 
iv) A positive relationship between performance and D V L Y R (H2). 
v) W e are also expecting that A G E will have an overall negative relationship with 
performance, while N B A E X P will be positive. 
vi) Finally, w e expect that the more a player's salary differs from that of the team as a 
whole, or the greater a percentage of team payroll he represents, the higher his 
performance would be. 
The first regression was run using SUM as the dependant variable. The independent 
variables and regression results are shown in Table 1. Only two variables proved to be 
significant, age and minutes played per game. The positive coefficient on the M T N P G variable is 
not surprising since the dependant measure is also measured per game, and the negative 
coefficient on the age variable indicates that younger players will have better per game statistics. 
An interesting result is the absence of a significant coefficient on any of the contract variables. A 
joint significance test yielded an F-statistic of 0.754 with a p-value of 0.607, implying that these 
6
 A three-pointer is an attempt at a basket during regular overtime or game play, which is taken from a point 22 or 
more feet away from the basket. 
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variables are not jointly significant. Although this finding is contrary to the our hypothesis, it is 
possible that the level of control a player may or may not have over their per game averages 
explains this finding. 
Table 1 
Dep Var: S U M 
R-Squared: 0.8625 
Variable 
FG 
FT 
YROFK 
KLENGTH 
KAMT 
AGE 
YRSNBA 
NBAEXP 
MINPG 
KCOMP 
TEAMPAY 
MEDIFF 
ANNUALSA 
PCTTEAMP 
DVFYR 
DVLRY 
DVINT 
Degrees of freedom: 
184 
Coefficient 
0.062 
0.029 
0.931 
-0.305 
0.059 
-0.779 
0.724 
-5.817 
0.817 
0.647 
0.008 
0.0396 
-0.0377 
9.638 
0.702 
0.268 
0.538 
#ofObs: 
202 
T-stat 
1.245 
0.8996 
0.8058 
-0.359 
1.158 
-3.141** 
0.6717 
-0.2041 
20.42** 
0.0956 
0.2077 
0.1307 
-0.0899 
0.7516 
0.5862 
0.1567 
0.2740 
** =p-value <05 
The second regression used A C C as the dependant variable, with the independent 
variables and regression results displayed in Table 2. In this case, quite a few variables were 
significant, including the year of contract the player is in, the length of the contract, age, seasons 
played in the N B A , percentage of life spent in the N B A , minutes played per game, and 
percentage of contract completed. 
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Table 2 
Dep Var: A C C 
R-Squared: 0.35 
Variable 
YROFK 
KLENGTH 
KAMT 
AGE 
YRSNBA 
NBAEXP 
MINPG 
KCOMP 
TEAMPAY 
MEDIFF 
ANNUALSA 
PCTTEAMP 
DVFYR 
DVLRY 
DVINT 
Degrees of freedom: 
184 
Coefficient 
3.7495 
-1.8113 
0.017863 
0.60843 
-2.522 
61.191 
0.19915 
-23.694 
0.0095077 
0.23130 
-0.42544 
-1.0575 
-2.7495 
4.5681 
5.361 
#ofObs: 
202 
T-stat 
3.853** 
-2.466** 
0.3991 
2.890** 
-2.732** 
2.494** 
6.288** 
-4.172** 
0.2859 
0.8678 
-1.158 
-0.09372 
-2.657** 
3.121** 
3.190** 
** =p-value <05 
Furthermore, a player being in his first, last or in a one-year contract has significant 
results, all in the expected direction. This result is consistent with Berri and Krautmann's (2006) 
finding that performance does in fact drop off in the first year after contract signing. 
Some of the other variables, however, do not show the expected direction of effect. For 
example, these results imply that as age increases, accuracy actually increases. On the other 
hand, years spent in the N B A has a negative relationship with accuracy, implying that the longer 
a player is in the N B A , the lower his accuracy is. Since the age increase along with years in the 
NBA, it is hard to say why these variables show opposing effects, and contrary to those expected. 
Another problematic finding is that the coefficient on the year of contract variable is positive, 
while the contract completion variable shows a much larger, and negative, effect. These two 
contradictory results will be discussed at length in the next section. A last observation that 
warrants mention is the R-squared values of the two regressions. Although in our summation 
measure, over 8 6 % of the variance is explained, this number drops down to only 3 5 % in the 
second equation. Finally, in neither regression were the "star" (MEDDIFF and P C C T T E A M P ) 
or salary measures significant. This is most likely due to the simplicity of measuring a player's 
star quality in this method, since salary can represent other aspects, such as ability to draw fans, 
which may be quite unrelated to actual on-court performance. 
Finally, two other regressions were performed. These used offensive (points per game + 
assists per game + rebounds per game) and defensive (blocks per game) statistics, respectively. 
However, the results of these regressions were inconclusive and explained less variance than 
when the summation measure was used as the dependant variable, so they will not be discussed at 
length here. 
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Discussion 
Our regression analyses supports all three hypotheses. However, since H 2 was stated 
onlv in terms of the year of player's contract without taking into account the percentage of 
contract-completed variable, w e can say that this is only partly supported. The strong support for 
hypothesis one indicates that players do in fact decrease their performance immediately after 
signing a new contract, and the partial support for hypothesis two suggests that players do 
increase their performance as time goes on. Finally, hypothesis 3, predicting increased contract 
length to correlate with lower performance is also supported. However, the contradiction 
between the year of contract and contract completion warrants further discussion. 
The contract completion variable indicates that performance decreases by a large and 
marginally significant amount as the end of the contract nears. In this case, the difference in raw 
contract years versus percentage completed must be explored. Since the percentage measure 
gives us a measure relative to contract length, w e would expect it to be a better measure of the 
effect of contract stage on performance. That the coefficient on this variable is negative poses a 
problem in terms of our conclusions. Is it possible that players reduce their performance as their 
contract re-negotiation period increases? One would tend to argue no, as this would violate any 
assumption of rationality on the part of the player. One possible explanation is that the player is 
unable to control his performance exactly the way he wants when he wants (Berri and 
Krautmann, 2006). Also, as Krautmann (1990) noted, player performance includes a random 
component, where a player's performance may be exceptionally good or bad in individual years, 
but overall it will tend towards the average. 
In our sample, it is possible that players received lucrative contracts and were placed in 
starter positions because they had exceptional performance in the years preceding the contract 
and therefore their subsequent performance was simply tending towards the average. The young 
age of our sample (average = 24.9 years old) would also help to explain this result, as they are 
still inexperienced and may not be capable of manipulating their performance at will. 
Alternatively, it is possible that once receiving a lucrative contract, players feel the need to 
"prove themselves" and therefore over-perform, with their performance decreasing over time. 
However, this is also problematic, as it is inconsistent with the finding that performance 
decreases in the first year after a contract is signed. In fact, by just looking at the percentage of 
contract completed variable, our results would suggest that performance decreases upon contract 
signing and continues to decrease throughout the contract, regardless of the nearing completion 
date. This could reflect the effect of age or health as the player matures, however more detailed 
measurements of these variables would be needed to explore this possibility. A last point is that 
agents w h o represent younger players may build up their self-confidence and image, based on 
their previous performance against lesser talented players (i.e. classmates w h o did not go on to 
play professionally) to the point where it is detrimental when the player actually starts playing in 
a professional setting. Basketball is probably the one major league sport that makes younger 
players richer and more popular, particularly because players can be drafted out of high school 
and the game attracts much attention in large U.S. markets. Also, the emphasis on individual 
performance leads to pressure on individual players, which m a y be more difficult for younger 
players to handle. A last possibility is that, since much of the results support the theory that 
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performance increases over contract time, there is a problem with the percentage of contract 
completed variable in itself. 
The inconclusive results in our first regression may be due to the skewing of the data. 
Because only players w h o were not traded and were starters with uncomplicated contracts were 
considered, the data is generally skewed towards younger players. The average age of a player in 
our sample was almost 25 years old, with an average of 4.6 years in the N B A . This heavy 
representativeness of younger player may mean that players are still trying to prove themselves 
and are looking toward endorsement contracts and other sources of income. Older, more 
established players would be able to re-negotiate a contract based on their names and reputations, 
where relatively unknown players are still building up that reputation. Furthermore, the averages 
in our sample indicate that the average player was drafted around the age of 20, meaning that he 
has not even completed college. It would be expected that younger players would be used to 
being the best of the best, in high school and college. Therefore, their exposure to professional 
sports with more experienced players may hurt their confidence, as well as making their 
performance less malleable and more subject to opposing players' actions. The very young 
players may also experience some adverse reactions from the older players w h o may attempt to 
affect their performance with verbal and/or physical abuse. 
All of these factors would work to confound the effects of the variables measured and 
complicate the matter. W e would expect that a sample that had a more equal balance of older and 
younger players and spanned more seasons would show different results as any fluctuations 
would even themselves out. Unfortunately, more experienced players tend to have more 
complicated contract structures which complicate the analysis. Admittedly, the performance 
measures and independent variables were quite simplistic and represent only a crude estimation 
of true talent and motivation. It may be that there are intrinsic motivators at play, which are 
unaccounted for both in the motivational theories and variables considered. 
One question that begs attention is why the contract variables were significant in the latter 
regression but not in the former? It is believed that the difference lies in the performance 
measure. Although the summation of per game variables is an indicator of performance, it is 
subject to many outside influences. Rebounds, steals and block, as well as turnovers, are all 
interactions with other players from both teams. Additionally, the points and assists per game can 
be thwarted by another team's good defense regardless of the player's accuracy. Therefore, the 
accuracy variable may be a better measure of ability and performance, while the summation 
measure is clouded by the abilities and efforts of other players. 
Finally, the difference in the r-squared reported for the two regressions warrants a 
discussion. In the regression with S U M as the dependant variable, the R-squared was around 
0.86, while the regression using A C C as the dependant variable reported an R-squared of only 
0.35. Obviously, the first model did a better job of explaining the variance in performance. The 
performance variable A C C was meant to measure a player's ability and accuracy. However, the 
"ability" measure is absent from the variable list. In future research, a variable depicting an 
interaction of draft round and position may help to isolate this aspect of performance. 
Furthermore, it is possible that the large, negative effect of contract percentage completed is 
capturing some of this effect. Unfortunately, it will be hard to tell if this is the case without 
collecting further data. 
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It is harder to explain why the S U M performance measure regression reported an R-
squared almost double that of the A C C performance variable It could be that when a 
performance vanable is affected by factors outside of the player s control, the omitted ability 
measure isn't as important and the variance is well explained by the includedloanable* 
However this issue would require further research, as it is hard to imagine w h y variables, which 
do not explain an "unpolluted" performance measure, do a better job of explaining a more 
"polluted" one. 
There are several obvious limitations of this study. For one, measures of health and 
ability are clearly missing, which could serve to change the results. Also, the skewed age and 
experience distribution surely affects our results. Finally, although professional sports provide an 
interesting venue for analysis, it is difficult to say h o w generalizable such results would be to 
other professionals working on fixed-term contracts. Another issue is the relatively small sample 
size. Although 202 observations is substantial, it was noticed that this data was quite sensitive to 
even one or two outlying values. Therefore, further research utilizing a larger data set with some 
additional measures would be warranted. 
Conclusion 
As the "Shirking or Stochastic productivity in Major League Baseball" debate 
(Krautmann, 1990; Scoggins, 1993; Krautmann, 1993) shows, the performance measure used can 
have a large influence on the results obtained. In this study, when w e considered outcomes that 
can potentially be heavily influenced by factors outside of the individual's control (i.e. other 
players) w e saw no significant effect of contract life. However, when a measure closer 
approximating the player's actual ability is used, there is a significant change in performance 
observed over the contract life, although some of these effects are contrary to our hypothesized 
results. 
Since we would not expect to see young, inexperienced executives being offered fixed-
term contracts, our results may not easily generalize to other contract variations. Namely, we 
would expect that executives being offered fixed-term contracts would have a proven track record 
behind them, unlike the new players in our sample w h o may have experienced a year of outlier 
statistics and then negotiated based on these data. Similarly, reputation would play a larger role 
for executives, so that they would have an advantage over young basketball players in initial 
negotiations, but they would also have an incentive to keep their image up to capitalize on further 
negotiations. O n the other hand, senior executives may be more vulnerable to factors outside of 
their control. Industry environment, economic variables, and company specific factors can all 
detract from the control that an executive can exert over his job, and by extension his 
performance. In this case, w e would see an ambiguous relationship between the contract length, 
stage of contract and performance, which may be due to other factors. Finally, measuring 
performance is much more complicated than simple sports statistics. Given that the definition of 
performance can produce different results even in a relatively easily quantifiable field like 
professional basketball, the choice of performance measurement in more complex jobs would be 
an important consideration. 
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In general, the preceding discussion highlights the importance of considering variables 
within and outside of the control of the person of interest. In extending fixed-term contracts, 
organizations must carefully consider the other parties motivations and past performance record. 
Negotiating parties cannot allow their judgment to be clouded by reputation, or recent 
performance, at the detriment of considering possible future outcomes. Contract lengths must be 
negotiated and set so as to allow both parties the security inherent in fixed-term contracts, but 
also to allow periodic incorporation of new information and performance results. It would be 
interesting to continue a longitudinal study to see where the players whose performance appeared 
to decrease over the life of their contract find themselves upon re-negotiation. 
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